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THE BIVENS REMEDY
IN PRISONERS' RIGHTS LITIGATION
Federal and state prisoners often seek to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the conditions of prison life.1 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code (section 1983)2 provides a statutory remedy for
damages actions brought against state and local officials to redress
deprivations of civil rights.' Under the authority of section 1983,
prisoners may bring civil rights suits in federal courts against state
prison officials.4 Section 1983, however, does not authorize prisoners to
sue federal prison officials.' In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,6 the United States Supreme Court
established a private right of action implied directly from the United
States Constitution under which persons may sue federal officials to
redress deprivations of federal constitutional rights.' The Bivens
' See PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS, 8-9 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ALDERSERT REPORT] (describing significant volume of prisoner rights
cases and citing Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts 1979 and Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court,
57 F.R.D. 573 (1972)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3 Id. Section 1983 is a derivative of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)). Congress enacted the 1871 Civil Rights Act during the Reconstruction Period
primarily to provide civil rights protection against state government toleration of
widespread violence inflicted upon Blacks. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80 (1961),
overruled, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 315, 334, 374, 428, 505,
653 (1871) (comments of Reps. Burchard, Hoar, Lowe, and Beatty, and Sens. Pratt and
Osborn, respectively). Until the 1960s, however, judicially afforded relief under § 1983 was
rare and often ineffective. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate
Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L. J. 361 (1951); See Developments in the Law: Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1167-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and
Federalism]. In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court resurrected the § 1983 cause of action
by recognizing a civil damages remedy for persons injured by the constitutional violations
of state officials. 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961). After the Monroe decision, the volume of civil
rights cases brought under § 1983 increased dramatically. See Section 1983 and Federalism,
supra, at 1136.
' See generally Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits
in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610 (1979) (analysis of prisoner § 1983 suits brought
against state prison officials).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The statutory remedy most analogous to
the § 1983 cause of action is the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA). Ch. 753, § 410(a), 60 Stat.
843 (1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2402, 2411-2412,
2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (allowing parties to sue United States government for tort-
ious conduct of federal officials); see infra notes 119-124 and accompanying text (describing
FTCA).
6 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
7 Id. at 390-97. The remedy the Bivens decision created generally is available only to
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remedy, therefore, provides a method by which prisoners may sue
plaintiffs suing federal, as opposed to state, defendants. See infra notes 19-25 and accompa-
nying text (describing Bivens remedy). A number of lower federal courts, however, chose to
extend the Bivens theory to the fourteenth amendment and found municipalities liable for
civil rights violations after the Supreme Court limited the scope of § 1983 actions to exclude
municipalites from the statute's coverage. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961)
(excluding municipalities from liability under § 1983); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980); see,
e.g., Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (cause of ac-
tion allowed under fourteenth amendment in action against municipality when plaintiff
alleged physical abuse by city police officers); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1288,
1305-06 (D. D.C. 1976) (supplemental opinion) (cause of action granted under fourteenth
amendment in action against District of Columbia when plaintiff alleged unlawful arrest
while making public speech); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp. 557, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(cause of action under fourteenth amendment in action against city when plaintiff alleged
beating inflicted by police officers); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(cause of action under fourteenth amendment in action against city when plaintiff alleged
unlawful arrest); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 914-16 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (cause of
action under fourteenth amendment in action against city when former city employee alleged
racial discrimination in employment dismissal). But see Mitchell v. Chester County Farms
Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271, 274 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no cause of action under fourteenth amend-
ment in action against county prison).
The Supreme Court recognized that some lower courts were implying causes of action
directly from the fourteenth amendment, but the Court chose to defer a decision upon
whether the lower courts' actions were proper. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). The Court later eliminated the obstacle to municipal
liability that initially encouraged the lower courts to extend the Bivens theory to the four-
teenth amendment, by establishing that municipalities are liable under § 1983. See Monell v.
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (good faith defense unavailable to municipalities under § 1983). Never-
theless, in certain situations § 1983 may not be as effective a remedy as the remedy provided
by the Bivens cause of action. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (§ 1983
relief unavailable when deprivation of property resulted not from established state pro-
cedure but from negligence of state agents and when state provided adequate remedy);
Crocker, When Cops are Robbers-Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct Under Sec-
tion 1983 and Bivens, 15 U. RicH. L. REV. 295, 305-16 (1981) (§ 1983 less effective remedy
than Bivens remedy in cases involving municipal inaction causing injury); Note, Vicarious
Municipal Liability: Creating a Consistent Remedial Policy for Local Government Viola-
tions of Civil Rights, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 58, 65-69 (1980) (§ 1983 not equally effective alter-
native remedy to Bivens actions because municipalities not completely liable under
vicarious liability).
A commentator has argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980), does not establish that the availability of § 1983 necessarily precludes Bivens
claims against unconstitutional state action. See Wolcher, Soverign Immunity and the
Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Viola-
tions, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 293 (1981). The argument's foundation is the Green Court's
statement that a parallel statutory remedy will not preclude a judicially implied remedy
unless Congress explicitly declares that the statute provides an exclusive remedy. See
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980; infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (holding
in Carlson v. Green). Thus, the narrow legislative intent limitation established in Green ap-
pears to permit Bivens actions against state officials and local governments because nothing
in the language or legislative history of § 1983 declares the statute to be a substitute for a
judicially implied remedy. See 446 U.S. at 30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In most recent decisions, however, courts have been unwilling to imply a Bivens cause
of action when § 1983 was available. See, e.g., Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th
PRISONERS' RIGHTS LITIGATION
federal officials for violations of the prisoners' constitutional rights
The nature of prison life breeds prisoners' complaints,9 the majority
of which are frivolous." Among the many frivolous prisoner rights cases,
however, a significant number of meritorious complaints exist which
raise important constitutional questions." The excessive number of sec-
tion 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in recent years has over-
burdened federal courts and created serious problems in identifying
meritorious prisoners' claims." In contrast to the proliferation of state
Cir. 1981) (construing Carlson v. Green) (no basis for constitutionally implied action when
statutory remedy available under § 1983); Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 685-86
(3d Cir. 1980) (cause of action implied from fourteenth amendment unnecessary when § 1983
available), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); City of West Haven v. Turpin, 591 F.2d 426,
427 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) on remand from 439 U.S. 974, cert. denied, 439 U.S. at 988
(1978) (vacating 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc)) (Monell decision eliminates need to im-
ply cause of action against municipality under fourteenth amendment); Cale v. City of Cov-
ington, 586 F.2d 311, 318 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating decision implying cause of action under the
fourteenth amendment); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 1977) (no basis for constitu-
tionally implied remedy when statutory remedy available under § 1983); Pagano v. Hadley,
535 F. Supp. 92, 100 (D. Del. 1982) (direct damages action not implicit in fourteenth amend-
ment); Strong v. Demopolis City Bd. of Educ., 515 F. Supp. 730, 732 n.1 (S.D. Ala. 1981) (four-
teenth amendment does not afford implied cause of action); Harris v. Arizona Bd. of
Regents, 528 F. Supp. 987, 993 (D. Ariz. 1981) (no constitutionally based cause of action infer-
red when statutory remedy under § 1983 available); Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 511 F.
Supp. 1156, 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (declining to imply cause of action from fourteenth amend-
ment when § 1983 remedy available); Highfield Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 488 F.
Supp. 1176, 1193 (D. Md. 1980) (remedy not implied from constitution when § 1983 cause of
action existed); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324, 348 (D. Vt. 1979) (declining to
imply cause of action directly from constitution when § 1983 claim stated). But see Jones v.
City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622, 624 (6th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff has direct cause of action against
municipality for violation of constitutional rights), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1974); Rhodes
v. City of Wichita, 516 F. Supp. 501, 502 (D. Ka. 1981) (Bivens action allowed against city
under fourteenth amendment); cf. Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 98 n.2
(5th Cir. 1979) (dictum) (Fifth Circuit has implied causes of action from fourteenth amend-
ment); Smith v. Jordan, 527 F. Supp. 167, 172-73 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (dictum) (Bivens claim
under fourth amendment would be permitted against state officials).
' See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980) (allowing Bivens action against
federal prison official); infra text accompanying notes 38-42 (discussing Carlson v. Green).
Federal prisoners file the overwhelming majority of Bivens suits brought in the litigation of
prisoners' rights, although state prisoners have brought Bivens actions against federal of-
ficials on rare occasions. See, e.g., Nees v. Bishop, 524 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-13 (D. Colo. 1981)
(Bivens cause of action established when federal agent allegedly deprived state prisoner of
sixth amendment right to counsel).
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973) (potential for prisoners' disputes).
II See ALDERSERT REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10 (citing Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Court, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972)).
" See id. at 7, 11 (significant number of prisoners' complaints raise important constitu-
tional questions).
12 See id. at 11. See generally Turner, supra note 4 (overburdening of federal judicial
system resulted from growth in number of prisoner § 1983 suits); Note, Limitation of State
Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in Federal Courts, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 115 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Limitation of State Prisoners' Suits] (increasing prisoner § 1983 suits creating
strain on federal judicial system).
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prisoners' section 1983 suits, the number of federal prisoners' petitions
has declined, presumably due to the effectiveness of federal inmate
greivance procedures.13 Federal prisoners' complaints are subject, never-
theless, to the rigorous screening processes that courts have created to
limit the growing number of state prisoners' section 1983 suits. 4 An ad-
ditional problem federal prisoners encounter is the lack of an effective
statutory remedy in suits against federal officials." The only legal
recourses available to federal prisoners suing federal officials for
deprivations of the prisoners' constitutional rights are the remedies that
the Bivens cause of action, the Federal Tort Claims Act,"6 and the federal
statutes of habeas corpus1 7 and mandamus 8 provide.
The Supreme Court initiated the development of the consti-
tutionally implied cause of action 9 in 1971 with the Bivens deci-
13 See ALDERSERT REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 n.9 (decline in federal prisoner cases
possibly result of federal inmate grievance procedures); 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (1981) (ad-
ministrative remedy procedure for inmates confined in Bureau of Prisons institutions).
Established by the Bureau of Prisons, the administrative remedy procedure enables inmates
to seek formal review of complaints relating to imprisonment. Id. The procedure initially re-
quires inmates to attempt to resolve their complaints informally with Bureau of Prisons
staff members. Id. § 542.13(a). If informal resolution is unsuccessful, inmates may file a for-
mal written complaint. Id. § 542.13(b). Once an inmate files a formal complaint, the Warden
of the federal prison normally must respond within thirty days. Id. § 542.14. If an inmate is
not satisfied with the Warden's response, the inmate may appeal the response to the
Regional Director and finally, if necessary to the Bureau of Prisons' Office of General
Counsel. Id. § 542.15.
" See Limitation of State Prisoners'Suits, supra note 12, at 119-22 (courts have broad
discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis prisoners' suits that courts deem frivolous or
malicious). The discretionary judicial practice of dismissing in forma pauperis petitions
greatly restricts prisoners' rights actions because most prisoners file in forma pauperis peti-
tions to bring court actions without paying filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976)
(authorizing federal courts to commence actions brought by persons unable to pay court
fees); Limitation of State Prisoners' Suits, supra note 12, at 119 n.6. Courts also dismiss
most suits in which prisoners fail to exhaust administrative remedies properly before the
prisoners file court actions. See infra note 75 (exhaustion requirement in prisoners' suits).
" See infra text accompanying notes 119-35 (describing FTCA as a remedy for
prisoners' suits against federal officials). The FTCA allows direct recovery against the
federal government for certain intentional torts committed by federal officials. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1976). In Carlson v. Green, however, the Supreme Court held that the availability
of damages under the FTCA does not preclude a Bivens claim because the remedy provided
by the FTCA is less effective than the Bivens remedy. 446 U.S. at 19-23 (1980).
"' Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (current version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
" Id. § 1361.
' See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). A private cause of action exists when the plaintiff is a member of a class that
may invoke the court's power to decide a controversy on the legal merits. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40 n.18 (1979). Before the court determines whether a cause of
action is present, the plaintiffs complaint must demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction
to hear the case. Id. In cases in which the complaint asserts a constitutionally implied cause
of action, a substantial claim that the Court may imply a remedy from the Constitution will
[Vol 40:215
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sion." In Bivens, the plaintiff sought damages from federal officials who
allegedly performed an illegal search and seizure.2' The Bivens Court
support federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3562 (1975). If the court finds that the plaintiffs com-
plaint presents a substantial claim that an implied constitutional remedy exists, then the
court should evaluate the substantive legal issues involved to determine whether the allega-
tions in the complaint state a cause of action upon which the court can grant relief. See Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
In addition to establishing an implied constitutional remedy, the Supreme Court has
implied causes of action from rights created by particular federal statutes that do not ex-
pressly provide a private remedy. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cur-
ran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1839-41 (1982) (private cause of action implicit in Commodities Ex-
change Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979) (im-
plied private remedies exist under § 215 but not under § 206 of the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964) (implied cause of action pro-
vided under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39-42 (1916) (Court implied railroad employee's personal injury action from
federal statute prescribing railroad equipment standards). The Supreme Court has
restricted substantially the statutory implication doctrine in recent years. See generally
Comment, A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 505 (1980);
Note, The Implication Doctrine After Touche Ross and Transamerica: The State of Implied
Causes of Action in Federal Regulatory Statutes, 26 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1980-81).
Statutorily implied remedies do not provide an important legal device in the litigation
of prisoners' rights. In the few prisoners' suits that have asserted statutorily implied
remedies, courts generally have refused to imply causes of action. See, e.g., Micklus v.
Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 233-39 (3d Cir. 1980) (when young adult offender alleged injury due to
governmental noncompliance with Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA) cause of action im-
plied from due process clause of fifth amendment rather than directly from YCA); Owens v.
Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247-48 (2d Cir.) (no cause of action implied from statute authorizing
United States to contract with local authorities for imprisonment of federal prisoners when
federal prisoners sued for injuries allegedly incurred while housed in county jail pursuant to
contract), cert denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir.
1977) (no cause of action implied from federal statutes regulating transportation and label-
ing of goods made by prisoners when state prisoner alleged illegal operation of prison in-
dustries).
21 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971). The Supreme Court established the base for the Bivens
decision twenty-five years earlier in Bell v. Hood. See 327 U.S. 678 (1946), noted in 403 U.S.
at 389, 392. In Bell, the Court held that federal district courts have federal question jurisdic-
tion over claims for damages against federal officials who allegedly violated the fourth
amendment rights of individuals. 327 U.S. at 684-85; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (providing federal question jurisdiction). The Bell Court reserved judgment, however,
on the issue of whether courts properly may imply such claims directly from the Constitu-
tion. See 327 U.S. at 694-95 (recognizing Bell as case of first impression). Commentators
have followed closely the development of the Bivens remedy. See generally Note,
"Damages or Nothing"-- The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 667
(1979); Note, Bivens and the Creation of a Cause of Action for Money Damages Arising
Directly from the Due Process Clause, 29 EMORY L. J. 231 (1980); Note, Remedies for Con-
stitutional Torts: "Special Factors Counseling Hesitation," 9 IND. L. REv. 441 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Remedies]; Note, The Limits of Implied Constitutional Damage Ac-
tions: New Boundaries for Bivens, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Limits
of Implied Actions].
11 403 U.S. at 389-90. The plaintiffs complaint in Bivens asserted that agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting without a warrant or probable cause and using
1983]
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concluded that the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action under the fourth amendment.2 2 Although the
Court recognized that the explicit language of the fourth amendment
does not provide a mechanism for the fourth amendment's enforcement,
the Court held that, based upon the general remedial powers of the
federal courts, an action for damages was implicit within the scope of the
protection the fourth amendment affords.' The Court concluded,
therefore, that the Bivens plaintiff was entitled to receive a monetary
award to redress any injuries he suffered as a result of the agents' viola-
tion of his fourth amendment rights. 4 The Bivens Court suggested,
however, that the Court might not have implied a remedy for damages
from the Constitution if special factors had been present to discourage
the Court from considering issues Congress had not taken affirmative
action on.25
Ten years after the Bivens decision the Supreme Court decided two
cases in successive terms that clarifiedand expanded the constitutionally
implied damages remedy. In Davis v. Passman,"6 the plaintiff, a congres-
sional staffperson dismissed from work because of her sex, brought an
action for damages against the congressman who fired herY The Court
unreasonable force, arrested and shackled Bivens, the plaintiff, in the view of his family. Id.
at 389. Although the complaint did not state explictly that the agents performed the search
and seizure without probable cause, the Court implied this allegation from other language
within the complaint. See id. at 389 n. 1. The agents allegedly proceeded to search Bivens'
residence thoroughly. Id. at 389. The complaint further asserted that the officers inter-
rogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search at a federal courthouse. Id.
Id. at 390-95, 97.
Id. at 395-97.
2 Id. at 397. The Bivens concurrence stated that a damage remedy was necessary to
redress Bivens' injuries because other alternative remedies either was inadequate or inap-
plicable. Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring). Injunctive relief would have been useless to
Bivens since an injunction could not rectify the past harm. Id. Also, assuming that prosecu-
tors had not brought any criminal charges against Bivens, the exclusionary rule was not an
applicable remedy. Id. Further, state remedies were inadequate since the fourth amend-
ment's protection of privacy interests usually is more extensive than the protection afford-
ed by state trespass laws. Id. at 394-95; Id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring).
' 403 U.S. at 396. The Bivens Court cited two examples of situations in which special
factors might be present that would limit the Court's willingness to find a constitutionally
implied cause of action. Id. at 396-97. In the first example, the Court suggested that federal
fiscal policy matters could act as special factors. Id. (citing United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1974) (implied cause of action unavailable for government to recover
expenses incurred after solider tortiously injured since Congressional policy to authorize
expenditures rather than receive payments). In another example, the Court stated that a
special factor existed when a congressional employee's conduct exceeded his authority but
did not constitute an unconstitutional act. Id. at 396-97 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 652 (1963) (implied cause of action denied to plaintiff seeking damages for congressional
employee's illegal but not unconstitutional conduct). The Supreme Court developed the
special factors limitation to the implication doctrine in the later cases. See infra note 45.
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
442 U.S. at 230-31. The defendant in Davis was a United States Congressman from
Louisiana when the case began. Id. The Congressman hired the plaintiff, Davis, as an admin-
istrative assistant, and then fired her six months later. Id. After terminating Davis's em-
[Vol 40:215
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held that the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment provides a right to be free from gender
discrimination." Therefore, because the plaintiff, Davis, asserted a viola-
tion of her fifth amendment right to due process and the only method
available to vindicate her rights was the power of the judiciary, the
Court held that Davis had a cause of action under the Constitution.' In
determining whether a damages remedy was available to redress the in-
juries resulting from violations of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, the Court considered several factors. First, the Court
established that federal courts were capable of deciding the allocation of
monetary relief in decisions like Davis since that case did not present
complex questions of valuation or causation."0 Next, the Court stated
that alternative forms of relief were not available to Davis." Additionally,
the Court held that Congress had not expressly preempted the judiciary
from implying a constitutional remedy in the Davis case.2 Finally, the
Davis Court held that the creation of an implied constitutional remedy
for violations of the fifth amendment due process clause would not flood
the federal courts with similar cases." The Court stated that, in any
case, the limits imposed on judicial resources should not affect the pro-
tection of constitutional principles." The Court also suggested but did
not decide that a suit brought against a congressman for actions within
his official capacity could present special concerns that, as the Court had
pronounced in Bivens, might limit the implication of constitutional
remedies.3 The Court concluded that the plaintiff in Davis was entitled
ployment, the Congressman wrote a letter to Davis in which he explicitly stated that she
had been a capable worker but that a man should occupy the position. Id. at 230 n.3.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 243-44. A statute providing a means to enforce nondiscriminatory employment
actions for congressional staffpersons was not available to Davis. See id. at 243-44 n. 21.
"Id. at 245. The Davis Court stated that federal courts were familiar with evaluating
sex discrimination claims in which backpay remedies were sought, because of the courts' ex-
perience with suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3' 442 U.S. at 245. The Davis Court observed that equitable relief in the form of job
reinstatement was inappropriate because the defendant was no longer a congressman and
thus incapable of rehiring Davis. Id.
' Id. at 246-47. The Davis Court found that Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
did not establish an explicit congressional declaration that would foreclose the implication of
judicial remedies for persons whom the Act does not protect. 442 U.S. at 247.
Id. at 248.
"Id.
Id. at 246; see 403 U.S. at 396; supra note 25 and accompanying text (special factor
limitation in Bivens decision). The Davis Court suggested that under the speech or debate
clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 6, cl. 1, a Congressman might be immune from suits for
actions the Congressman performs within the scope of his official conduct. See 446 U.S. at
235 n.11, 246. The Court chose to remand the issue of whether the speech and debate clause
shielded Passman from liability. See id. at 236 n. 11. The Court clearly stated, however, that
absent a lower court's finding of Passman's immunity under the speech and debate clause,
Passman could be held personally liable for any violations of Davis' fifth amendment due
process rights. Id. at 246.
1.983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
to a cause of action for damages to vindicate any violation of her fifth
amendment right to due process."
In Carlson v. Green,7 the Supreme Court extended the scope of the
Bivens cause of action to include suits brought to redress injuries caused
by federal officials' violations of the eighth amendment. 8 In Green, plain-
tiff's decedent, while incarcerated in federal prison, died allegedly as a
result of inadequate medical attention. 9 The plaintiff in Green could
have presented the allegations in the complaint as a claim against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)." The Green
Court established, however, that a Bivens claim for damages against the
individual federal officers was an appropriate remedy to redress the in-
juries caused by the officers' alleged violation of the eighth amend-
ment. 1 By reasoning that the Bivens remedy was more effective than




446 U.S. 14 (1980).
Id. at 16, 18-23. The eighth amendment of the Constitution provides the right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. The Green Court did not
explain the extension of the Bivens remedy to eighth amendment violations. Instead, the
Court primarily addressed the issue of whether Congress intended to limit the plaintiff's
suit to an action under the FTCA. 446 U.S. at 18-23; see infra text accompanying notes
40-42. In fact, the language of the Green opinion suggests that the Bivens decision created a
remedy for victims of constitutional violations in general. See 446 U.S. at 18.
' 446 U.S. at 16 n. 1. The plaintiff in Green sued on behalf of the estate of her deceased
son, a federal prisoner at the time of his death. Id. at 16. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleg-
ed that her son, who was afflicted with a serious asthmatic condition, died as a result of the
defendants' incompetent medical attention. Id. at 16 n. 1. The plaintiff asserted that the
defendants kept the prisoner in a medical facility which the defendants knew was grossly in-
adequate, against the advice of doctors. Id. When the prisoner had the asthmatic attack
which eventually led to his death, the defendants allegedly did not provide the prisoner
with competent medical attention for eight hours and they allegedly delayed excessively in
transferring the prisoner to an outside hospital. Id. The plaintiff asserted that the prisoner's
attack was made more severe because the defendants administered contra-indicated drugs
to the prisoner and impeded the prisoner's breathing by using a respirator the defendants
knew was inoperative. Id.
40 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980); see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) (allowing direct recovery against
the United States for certain intentional torts committed by federal officials); infra text ac-
companying notes 116-24 (describing Federal Tort Claims Act).
" 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980).
42 Id. at 20-23. The Court provided four reasons to support the decision in Green that
the Bivens remedy was more effective than the FTCA remedy. First, the Court stated that
the Bivens remedy served as a more effective deterrent to unconstitutional actions by
federal officials because the remedy is directly recoverable against individual tortfeasors
whereas the United States pays the judgments that courts award to successful FTCA plain-
tiffs. Id. at 21. Second, the FTCA prohibits punitive damages awards, but punitive damages
are available in Bivens actions. 446 U.S. at 22; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). Third, a jury is an
available option in a Bivens action, but not in a FTCA suit. 446 U.S. at 22; see 28 U.S.C. §
2402 (1976). Fourth, under the FTCA the liability of the United States is determined accord-
ing to the laws of the state in which the alleged tortious conduct occurred and, thus, the suc-
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The Green Court clearly stated that federal courts should not
restrict Bivens actions brought to redress constitutional injuries caused
by federal officials unless defendants can demonstrate that one of two
limitations apply.43 One limitation may arise from special factors that ad-
vise against judicial involvement in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." The Court, however, has not provided clear guidance as to
what constitutes a special factor. 5 Situations in which an equally effec-
tive statutory alternative is available also preclude Bivens claims, but
only if Congress explicitly has declared that the statute is a substitute to
a judicially implied remedy under the Constitution. 6 By requiring defend-
ants in Bivens suits to demonstrate one of the two specified limitations
to obtain a dismissal of the cause of action, the Green Court established
a presumption favoring judicial implication of Bivens remedies.47
The federal judiciary has responded affirmatively to the Bivens doc-
trine and consequently, the Bivens cause of action has become an
established mechanism in the litigation of civil rights disputes. Lower
courts began to extend the constitutionally implied damages remedy to
amendments other than the fourth even before the Supreme Court's
decisions in Davis and Green.8 The potential application of the Bivens
cess of FTCA claims may vary depending upon where the misconduct allegedly took place.
446 U.S. at 23. In contrast, uniform federal laws govern Bivens claims. 446 U.S. at 23.
'3 446 U.S. at 18-19.
" Id. at 18; see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
" See 446 U.S. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has not defined clear-
ly what constitutes a special factor limiting a constitutionally implied cause of action,
although the Court has suggested examples. In Bivens, the Court suggested that considera-
tions of federal fiscal policy or unlawful, but not unconstitutional, conduct were special fac-
tors courts must consider. 403 U.S. at 396-97; see supra note 25. The Davis Court added that
political questions and the speech and debate clause of the Constitution were also special
factors. 442 U.S. at 242, 246; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. In Green, the
Court suggested that a special factor also might exist when fear of personal liability might
deter government officials from effectively exercising their authority. 446 U.S. at 19 (1980);
see supra note 25. See generally Note, Remedies, supra note 20, at 453-67 (special factors
limitation in Bivens suits); Limits of Implied Actions, supra note 20, at 1251-65 (survey of
special factors in Bivens actions).
" 446 U.S. at 18-19; see infra note 124 (proposed legislation to amend FTCA to ex-
pressly provide adequate substitute for Bivens actions). See generally Limits of Implied
Actions, supra note 20, at 1248-51 (congressional intent limitation in Bivens actions).
" See 446 U.S. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 556 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir.
1977) (fifth amendment) (cause of action allowed when plaintiffs alleged rezoning land
deprived them of property without due process), rev'd in part, aff'd in part on other
grounds sub. nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391 (1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 174, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (first amendment) (cause
of action established when District of Columbia police officials ordered arrests of lawfully
gathered persons), cert denied, 435 U.S. 916, (1978); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.
1975) (thirteenth amendment) (cause of action established when black woman sued county
for her involuntary permanent sterilization); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rusfeld, 410 F.
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remedy expanded even further when, in 1976, Congress passed an
amendment to the general federal question jurisdiction statute, section
1331(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code (section 1331(a)),49 elimi-
nating the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for actions
brought against federal officials." Because section 1331(a) is the jurisdic-
tional predicate for Bivens causes of action,5 Congress' removal of the
historical amount in controversy requirement lightened the burden on
plaintiffs seeking Bivens remedies. Although plaintiffs apparently utilize
the Bivens action predominately to seek relief in the form of damages,
Bivens plaintiffs pursuing injunctive relief especially benefit by not hav-
ing to allege a minimum amount in controversy.2
Supp. 144, 160-61 (D. D.C. 1976) (sixth amendment) (cause of action established when United
States Army allegedly intercepted communications between plaintiff's attorney and consul-
tant on plaintiff's criminal case); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Ill. 1975)
(eighth amendment) (cause of action established when prison officials allegedly brutally
asaulted prisoner); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 650-51 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (four-
teenth amendment) (cause of action for deprivation of property without due process when
city rezoned plaintiff's land). See generally Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of
a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 531 (1977) (exhaustive survey of lower federal court extensions of Bivens
remedy to amendments).
'9 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal Constitution, laws, or treaties).
I Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. V 1981)) (removing historical $10,000 amount in controversy re-
quirement in actions under federal law against United States, federal agencies, or federal
employees in official capacity). Congress completely eliminated the amount in controversy
requirement for general federal question cases with the enactment of the Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. V 1981)). The 1976 amendment, however, was the significant
enactment from the perspective of Bivens plaintiffs since plaintiffs generally bring Bivens
claims against federal officials. See supra note 8 (federal prisoners file overwhelming ma-
jority of prisoners' Bivens suits).
11 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 398 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Bivens majority opinion did not establish clearly
the jurisdictional predicate for Bivens claims. The concurring opinion, however, suggested
that section 1331(a), not §§ 1343(a)(3)-(4) of Title 28 of the United States Code, was the
jurisdictional base for the plaintiff's claims in Bivens. 403 U.S. at 398 n. 1; see 28 U.S.C. §§
1343(a)(3), (4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (federal district courts have original jurisdiction over ac-
tions challenging deprivations, under color of state law, of federal civil rights). In subse-
quent decisions, the Court has established that § 1331 is the proper jurisdictional predicate
for constitutionally implied causes of action. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 231 (1979).
52 See supra note 50 (lack of amount in controversy requirement in federal question
suits). Although the Bivens, Davis, and Green plaintiffs all sought damages, lower federal
courts generally have held that injunctive relief also is available as a remedy in claims
brought under the Bivens cause of action. See 403 U.S. at 390-91; 442 U.S. at 231; 446 U.S. at
16; see, e.g., Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 241 (3rd Cir. 1980) (prisoner bringing Bivens
cause of action for violation of due process clause of fifth amendment entitled to injunctive
relief upon proving constitutional violation); Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1122 (5th
Cir. 1976) (dictum) (citing Bivens as authority for proposition that courts have power to en-
join harassment or repeated invasions of privacy); Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense
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In contrast to the beneficial absence of an amount in controversy re-
quirement, the sovereign immunity" of the United States government
operates- as a critical obstacle to plaintiffs bringing Bivens suits. The
United States is not subject to direct lawsuits unless the federal govern-
ment has waived sovereign immunity." The federal government has not
waived immunity for general constitutional torts committed by federal
officials.' Therefore, Bivens claimants must sue individual federal of-
ficials directly. Also, because the doctrine of respondeat superior is not
available in suits brought directly under the Constitution, 6 Bivens plain-
Comm. v. F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (federal courts have power to grant in-
junctive relief in Bivens claim asserting that federal agents deprived plaintiffs of constitu-
tional rights); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 514 F. Supp. 463,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (federal court has power to award injunztive relief in Bivens action
alleging infringement of fifth amendment right to due procelss); Doe v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539, 564 n. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1080) (courts may award injunctive
relief in Bivens action even though Bivens and Davis involved claims for money damages);
Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131, 1147 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (preliminary injunction granted
in inmates' action claiming federal officials' interI rence with constitutional right of access
to courts). But see Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116, 1120 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum)
(Bivens action traditionally has providedmeans of obtaining damages, not injunctions);
Lehmann, supra note 48, at 561-62 (Bivens cause of action should not provide basis for in-
junctive relief). The commentator viewed the Bivens holding narrowly and hypothesized
problems in applying a limited legal damages remedy in conjunction with the broad scope of
equitable remedies previously available in federal courts. Lehmann, supra note 48, at
561-62. The commentator's argument probably is not valid any longer in view of the
Supreme Court's subsequent expansion of the Bivens doctrine in Green, 446 U.S. 14, and
Davis, 442 U.S. 28. Se/supra text accompanying notes 26-47. Moreover, the Davis Court
stated that the issuance of injunctions is an established practice to protect constitutional
rights. 442 U.S. at'242 (dictum) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), and citing
Bivens, 403 U.S: at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
' See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979) (sovereign immunity doctrine
precludes'litigants from suing sovereign unless sovereign consents to suit).
" See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (United States immune from
suit except when immunity waived), reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 992 (1980); United States v. Sher-
wood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (United States immune from suit except when immunity waiv-
ed).
. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (dictum) (barrier of sovereign im-
munity frequently impenetrable in Bivens suits); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (plaintiff
limited to action against individual officials since federal government immune from suit);
Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982) (sovereign immunity bars Bivens suits
against United States). But see infra note 124 (legislative proposal to make United States
government liable for constitutional torts committed by federal officials).
I See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982) (doctrine of respondeat
superior not applicable in Bivens suits); Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622, 623 (6th Cir.
1978) (doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable in action brought directly under four-
teenth amendment), cert denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979); Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 337-38
(10th Cir. 1976) (respondeat superior inapplicable in action brought under the Constitution);
Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1976) (respondeat superior inapplicable
in actions against federal officials). The common-law doctrine of respondeat superior holds
an employer legally responsible for the conduct of the employer's agents or employees who
act within the scope of legitimate authority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
tiffs must identify the federal officials directly responsible for the alleged
violation. 7 Supervisory officials of federal agencies are proper defend-
ants only if they participated in or knew of the alleged misconduct.' The
unavailability of the doctrine of respondeat superior also restricts the
amount that Bivens claimants may recover to the assets of the federal
officials against whom the claim is brought. 9 The relatively low incomes
of federal civil servants often preclude the recovery of substantial
monetary awards against federal officials.6" Moreover, most Bivens
plaintiffs seeking to recover court-awarded judgments will be unable to
garnish the wages of federal officials.6 Thus, even if plaintiffs in Bivens
suits are able to identify the proper federal defendants, and are suc-
cessful in the lawsuit, Bivens plaintiffs may have difficulty obtaining the
full amount of damages awarded.
Bivens claimants may not bring actions against government officials
in every case, however, since federal officials sometimes may assert
the affirmative defense of immunity from suit.2 In Butz v. Econo-
11 See Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982) (Bivens defendants must
have been involved actively in alleged constitutional violation); Black v. United States, 534
F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1976) (in actions against federal officials plaintiff must allege defen-
dant's direct responsibility).
I See supra note 56. Since the specific federal officials committing tortious acts may
be difficult to identify, many plainiffs file complaints naming "unknown" officials as defen-
dants and courts may allow the plaintiff an opportunity to identify the defendants through
discovery. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 390 n. 2 (1971) (district court ordered complaint naming unknown federal agents
served upon agents that government records indicated participated in alleged misconduct);
Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (complaint named
unknown defendants whose names would be inserted when discovered), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 2234 (1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff entitled to
discover identity of "John Doe" defendants); Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("unknown agents" appropriate designation for existing persons whose names
plaintiff did not know yet). But see Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1976)
(dismissing complaint brought against unknown officials when plaintiff made suspect in-
quiries about officials' names).
" See supra notes 54-55 (United States government not liable for constitutional torts
committed by federal employees).
" See S. REP. No. 588, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2789, 2790.
8" See Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 10, 11 (1845); May Dept. Stores Co. v.
Smith, 572 F.2d 1275, 1276 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); Overmann v. United
States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1977). Garnishment is an ancilliary statutory pro-
ceeding whereby a party's tangible assets, such as wages, which are under control of a third
party, are applied directly to payment of a judgment in favor of the opposing party in the
original action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (5th ed. 1979).
"2 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732-38 (1982). The Supreme Court has
established two types of immunity defenses to protect government officials from undue in-
terference with the performance of their duties. Legislators and judges, acting in their of-
ficial capacity, are completely protected from suit under the defense of absolute immunity.
Id. at 2732-33 (citing Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) and
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)). Absolute immunity also extends to prosecutors,
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mou,63 the Supreme Court established that a Bivens claim would subject
most federal officials to liability unless the defendant official could suc-
cessfully assert a qualified immunity defense." The qualified immunity
defense traditionally allowed federal officials to escape liability if the
defendant officials satisfied objective and subjective elements of the
defense. 5 The objective element of the defense required officials to
demonstrate that they reasonably should not have known, or did not
know, that the action would cause the deprivation of another's constitu-
tional rights."8 The subjective element of the defense required officials to
have acted without an intent to maliciously violate the constitutional
rights of others. 7 The Supreme Court recently found that the amor-
phous nature of the subjective element of the qualified immunity
defense prolonged the litigation of insubstantial claims, thereby dimin-
ishing federal productivity and creating excessive government litigation
costs.8 The Court, therefore, eliminated the subjective element of the
qualified immunity defense. 9 In the future, the qualified immunity
defense generally will protect government officials from liability unless
officials acting within the scope of official responsibility violate clearly
established constitutional or federal statutory rights of which a
reasonable person should have had knowledge."
Despite the limitations of the Bivens cause of action,71 many plain-
tiffs sue federal officials under the Bivens theory." The Bivens remedy
is crucial in federal prisoner litigation since prisoners suing federal of-
ficials have limited effective means to redress violations of the
prisoners' constitutional rights." To litigate a Bivens claim, however,
federal prisoners must overcome procedural hurdles. 4 Moreover, many
executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions and to the President of the United
States. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct.
2690, 2700-701 (1982). Most other federal officials have the defense of qualified immunity.
Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2737-38.
" 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
" Id. at 504-08.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975), reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
Id. at 321.
67 Id.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737-38 (1982).
Id. at 2737-38.
70 Id.
71 See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text (limitations of Bivens remedy).
See Hearings on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979) (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney
General Schmults) (Department of Justice estimates over 2,000 constitutional tort claims
pending against federal officials).
" See infra notes 113-55 and accompanying text (effectivenss and availability of
FTCA, habeas corpus and mandamus remedies to prisoners).
" See Note, "Damages or Nothing"- The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 667, 674-82 (1979) (discussion of statute of limitations and personal jurisdic-
tion obstacles confronting Bivens plaintiffs).
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courts require federal prisoners to exhaust all remedies available under
the Federal Bureau of Prisons grievance procedures." The policy
reasons for imposing an exhaustion requirement on plaintiffs include using
agency expertise to develop a factual record, reinforcing the integrity of
the administrative process, and restricting the caseloads of already over-
burdened courts. 6 The exhaustion requirement may impose a substan-
tial hardship on prisoners, however, by effectively denying prisoners'
claims, significantly delaying the redress of injuries, or causing
prisoners to incur further injury by not allowing expedient recovery.7
To obviate the hardship caused by the exhaustion requirement, some
courts have not required exhaustion when the administrative remedies
available to plaintiffs are inadequate. 8 Thus, because the Bureau of
Prisons' administrative provisions do not authorize prison officials to
resolve damage claims,79 the Fourth Circuit has held that prisoners'
Bivens claims for damages may proceed directly to court." In any case,
" See Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664, 666-68 (10th Cir.) (Bivens claim brought by federal
prisoners dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1086 (1979); Jones v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (federal prisoners
could not maintain action for injunctive relief absent exhaustion of administrative remedies
in accordance with Bureau of Prisons policy statement); Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303,
306 (3rd Cir. 1973) (federal prisoner failing to exhaust administrative remedies could not
maintain habeas corpus proceeding); Waddell v. Alldredge, 480 F.2d 1078, 1079-80 (3d Cir.
1973) (mandamus action dismissed when federal inmates failed to exhaust administrative
remedies); Paden v. United States, 430 F.2d 882, 883 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (federal
prisoners' petition for court order denied for failure to exhaust Bureau of Prisons ad-
ministrative remedies); supra note 13 (describing Federal Bureau of Prisons grievance pro-
cedures).
See Zacharias, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-A Synthesis of the Law
and a Proposed Statute for Federal Prison Cases, 4 NEw ENG. J. OF PRISON LAw 5, 9-14
(1977).
" See id. at 16-21.
" See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, 483 F.2d 656 (3rd Cir. 1973) (re-
quirement of exhaustion of remedies waived when administrative remedies would be futile
in habeas corpus action on parole status), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 653, reh'g denied,
419 U.S. 1014 (1974); Green v. Nelson, 442 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (D. Conn. 1977) (federal
prisoner not required to exhaust administrative remedies when correction officials not com-
petent to decide constitutional question involved in prisoner's denial of parole); Brown v.
Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 762-63 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (exhaustion of administrative remedies
not required in habeas corpus petition by federal prisoners seeking transfer); Cravatt v.
Thomas, 399 F. Supp. 956, 970 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (federal prisoner bringing habeas corpus
petition not required to exhaust administrative remedies when sole claim involved constitu-
tional question); c.f. Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 991 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting ex-
haustion not required if Bureau of Prisons administrative procedure itself violates due pro-
cess rights).
"9 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.16 (1981).
" See Bey v. United States, No. 79-6828, slip. op. at 3, 4 (4th Cir. April 28, 1981) (per
curiam) (federal prisoners bringing Bivens actions for damages under first amendment not
required to exhaust Bureau of Prisons administrative remedies); Abdul-Khabir v.
Lichtenberger, 518 F. Supp. 673, 675 (E.D. Va. 1981) (federal prisoner not required to ex-
haust administrative remedies before suing to recover damages for alleged constitutional
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as the Fifth Circuit has stated, courts should not dismiss prisoners' com-
plaints for failure to exhaust administrative remedies before allowing
prisoner plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate that the prisoners
have exhausted all available administrative remedies, or that the ex-
haustion requirement should not apply because administrative remedies
are inadequate."
Even if federal prisoners have fulfilled the exhaustion requirement,
the prisoners' Bivens suits may be unsuccessful since federal officials
are entitled to a defense of qualified immunity for actions taken within
the scope of their official duties.2 Although the Supreme Court has not
ruled upon the degree of immunity available to federal prison officials, 3
the Court considered the immunity of state prison officials in Procunier
v. Navarette." In Procunier, a state prisoner brought an action under
section 1983.85 The complaint alleged that prison officials had violated
the prisoner's constitutional rights by interfering with the prisoner's
mail." The Court found that the first amendment did not protect the
mailing privileges of state prisoners at the time of the prison officials'
alleged misconduct. Ruling upon the defendants' defense of qualified
immunity, the Procunier Court held that the prison officials were im-
mune from any liability resulting from the violation of an undeclared
constitutional prescription.8
The qualified immunity defense also protected a federal prison of-
ficial from liability in a Bivens suit brought in the Sixth Circuit.88 In
Jihaad v. O'Brien,"0 a federal prisoner alleged that federal prison officials
had deprived the prisoner of his constitutional rights by disciplining the
prisoner for refusing to obey an order to shave." The Jihaad court found
violations). But c.f. Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (federal prisoner
bringing Bivens action under eighth amendment required to exhaust administrative
remedies), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980).
11 See Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1981) (prisoners' Bivens claim
alleging constitutional violations stated cause of action).
' See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (qualified immunity defense).
'3 But c.f Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (dictum) (doctrine of qualified im-
munity sufficient to protect federal prison officials from excessive personal liability).
434 U.S. 555 (1978).
Id. at 556; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (§ 1983 cause of action).
434 U.S. at 557.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 562-65.
See Jihaad v. O'Brien, 645 F.2d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Procunier v. Navarett,
434 U.S. 555 (1978)).
645 F.2d 556.
" Id. at 588. In Jihaad, the plaintiff wore a beard when he first arrived in prison. Id.
When prison officials ordered the plaintiff, Jihaad, to shave his beard, the prisoner did so
willingly. Id. Purportedly for religious reasons, the plaintiff grew another beard shortly
thereafter. Id. After Jihaad refused an order by a staff officer to shave, O'Brien, the defen-
dant and the Chairman of the Institution Discipline Committee, held a disciplinary hearing.
Id. O'Brien found Jihaad guilty of violating prison regulations, ordered Jihaad to shave his
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that because a clearly established constitutional right of prisoners to ex-
ercise religious freedom by wearing beards did not exist, the federal
prison official was immune from suit.2 The Eighth Circuit provided
another federal prison official with qualified immunity in a Bivens ac-
tion. 3 In Ervin v. Ciccone,94 a former federal prisoner brought an action
for damages alleging that federal prison officials placed the prisoner in
punitive solitary confinement in violation of the prisoner's fifth amend-
ment right of due process. 5 The Ervin court held that a clearly established
constitutional right of prisoners to notice and hearing prior to the im-
position of disciplinary actions was not in effect at the time the alleged
injustice occurred. 6 The Eighth Circuit found, therefore, that the federal
officials were entitled to qualified immunity from monetary liability for
the alleged denial of the prisoner's due process rights. 7 In Nees v.
Bishop," however, a district court held that a Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) agent was not entitled to qualified immunity from
damages liability in a Bivens suit. In Bishop, an FBI agent asserted the
qualified immunity defense in an action brought by a state prisoner
alleging the denial of the plaintiffs sixth amendment right to counsel in
a criminal proceeding.' The court ruled that, although the FBI agent
had acted in good faith the unreasonableness of the agent's action barred
the agent from asserting the qualified immunity defense.'
Courts addressing the immunity of federal officials from liability in
prisoners' suits have considered primarily whether the officials
reasonably should have recognized that the officials' actions would con-
beard, and placed the prisoner in disciplinary segregation for seven days. Id. The plaintiff
claimed that O'Brien had deprived Jihaad of his first amendment right to exercise religious
freedom. Id.
Id. at 561.
:3 See Ervin v. Ciccone, 557 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1977).
4 d.
11 Id. at 1261-62. In Ervin, the plaintiff also alleged that the condition of his solitary
confinement violated the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. at 1262. The Ervin court ruled that punitive solitary confinement in itself does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The plaintiff further asserted that the defen-
dant prison officials had taken retaliatory action against him because he was involved in
preparing legal material for other inmates. Id. The court held that prison officials constitu-
tionally could prohibit a prisoner from giving legal assistance to other inmates as long as the
officials provided legal assistance from persons trained in the law. Id.
Id. at 1262.
SId.
98 524 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981).
Id. at 1313.
10 Id. at 1311. The Bishop plaintiff alleged that after he was arrested on a federal
charge, jailed, and was awaiting trail he was denied the right to speak with an attorney. Id.
Police refused to permit a state public defender to see the plaintiff. Id. At trial, the district
court found a constitutional violation and assessed damages against the defendant officials.
Id. Following the conclusion of the trial, the defendant requested an appeal on the issue of
immunity. Id.
"' Id. at 1313.
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stitute a constitutional violation.' °2 By not deliberating upon whether the
federal officials maliciously intended to violate the prisoners' constitu-
tional rights, courts evaluating the immunity of federal officials from
prisoners' suits seem to have disregarded the subjective element of the
qualified immunity defense.' Thus, the Supreme Court's recent elimina-
tion of the subjective element of the qualified immunity defense' 4 prob-
ably will not affect the application of the defense in future prisoners'
suits brought against federal officials.
In furtherance of the limitations confronting prisoners bringing
Bivens suits, prisoners' Bivens claims are subject to motions to dismiss
if claimants fail to present facts that demonstrate constitutional viola-
tions. For example, Bivens claims have been dismissed for failing to
state constitutional claims when a probation officer refused to assume
discretionary supervision of a prisoner,"-' and also when prison officials
removed a fellow inmate from plaintiffs official visiting list without a
prior hearing.0 Courts however, should liberally interpret prisoners'
pro se complaints since pro se claimants draft pleadings without receiv-
ing legal assistance."7 Circuit courts, therefore, have overturned some
lower court decisions dismissing prisoners' Bivens claims for failure to
state a constitutional claim by holding the prisoners' pro se complaints
,02 See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text (cases addressing qualified immunity
of federal officials in prisoners' suits).
"3 See id.
"' See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737-38 (1982); supra text accompanying
notes 68-70.
"' See DeCosta v. United States Dist. Ct., 445 F. Supp. 989, 990-91 (D. Minn. 1978). In
DeCosta, the plaintiff sought to continue his college education in Minnesota when he was
released on parole from a federal prison in Minnesota. Id. at 990. The Minnesota probation
officer refused to accept supervision of the plaintiff because the plaintiff was not a Min-
nesota resident and the plaintiff had a lengthy criminal record. Id. The Court ruled that the
federal probation officer had discretionary authority to refuse to assume parole supervision
over the plaintiff. Id. at 991. Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff had not alleged
a constitutional violation and the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Id.
" See Fennell v. Carlson, 466 F. Supp. 56, 59 (W.D. Okla. 1978). In Fennell, a federal
prisoner alleged that prison officials violated the prisoner's fifth amendment right to due
process when the officials removed another inmate from the prisoner's visiting list. Id. at
58. The court held that a prisoner has no constitutional right to prison visitation and,
therefore, the prisoner's claim failed to state a constitutional cause of action. Id. at 59. The
court also found that the prison officials' limiting of the plaintiff's visiting privileges fur-
thered a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 60 n. 1.
'" See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (per curiam) (holding state prisoner's pro
se complaint to less stringent standards than attorney-drafted formal pleadings), reh'g
denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972). The overwhelming majority of prisoners filing judicial actions are
pro se ciamants. See ALDERSERT REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 3. In liberally interpreting a
prisoner's pro se Bivens complaint, the Fifth Circuit recently held that courts should not
dismiss prisoners' complaints unless the complaint clearly contains no facts that would en-
title a prisoner to relief. Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) (prisoners' Bivens claim alleging constitutional violations
stated cause of action).
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to less stringent standards than pleadings attorneys have drafted.10 8
Despite the obstacles, some federal prisoners have successfully
presented constitutional causes of action in Bivens suits. Courts have
found violations of prisoners' first amendment rights when prison of-
ficials unreasonably restricted mailing privileges"9 and when officials
disregarded a name change a prisoner made for religious reasons.110
Federal prisoners have also presented valid Bivens claims by alleging
violations of the fifth amendment right to procedural due process when
federal officials deprived prisoners of protected liberty interests."'
Moreover, some courts have found violations of the eighth amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when prisoners'
18 See, e.g., Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1981) (federal prisoner's
allegations of conspiratorily planned, retaliatory disciplinary actions by prison officials
stated cause of action); Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal prisoner
and wife stated constitutional claim alleging wife's visiting privileges suspended and
prisoner's good time credits withdrawn without due process under fifth amendment).
109 See Intersimone v. Carlson, 512 F. Supp. 526, 530-31 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (federal prison
officials' overbroad correspondence restrictions infringed prisoner's first amendment
rights).
11 See Salahuddin v. Carlson, 523 F. Supp. 314, 316 (E.D. Va. 1981) (cause of action
stated in complaint alleging federal prison officials failed to give proper effect to court order
legally changing prisoner's name).
.. See Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1981); Micklus v. Carlson, 632
F.2d 227, 239 (3d Cir. 1980); Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1255-56 (6th Cir. 1977); Bono v.
Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 941 (E.D. Ill. 1978); Murphy v. Fenton, 464 F. Supp. 53, 57 (M.D. Pa.
1978). Prison officials may not deprive prisoners of protected liberty interests without pro-
viding prisoners with procedural due process protections. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
488-89 (1980) (prisoner liberty interests protected by fourteenth amendment due process
rights). Constitutionally sufficient prison disciplinary proceedings may furnish procedural
due process protection of liberty interests. See generally Babcock, Due Process in Prison
Disciplinary Proceedings, 22 B.C. L. REV. 1009 (1981) (concluding prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings generally afford prisoners minimal due process protection). In certain prisoners'
Bivens actions, the Constitution provides liberty interests entitling prisoners to fifth
amendment due process protection. See, e.g., Murphy v. Fenton, 464 F. Supp. 53, 57 (M.D.
Pa. 1978) (conditions in administrative segregation unit created liberty interest protected
by procedural due process).
Courts also have implied prisoners' liberty interestsfrom federal statutes and regula-
tions in Bivens suits. See Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1981) (federal
parole statute creates constitutionally protected expectation of liberty); Micklus v. Carlson,
632 F.2 227, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1980) (Youth Correction Act's mandate of segregation and special
treatment of youth offenders created liberty interest protecting youth offender's fifth
amendment due process rights). Federal prison policy statements also may create expecta-
tions of liberty. See Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1255-56 (6th Cir. 1977) (Bureau of
Prisons policy statement created liberty interest by leading inmates to expect imposition of
disciplinary sanctions only on finding of major misconduct); Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934,
941 (E.D. Ill. 1978) (federal prison's policy statements created protected liberty interest by
encouraging inmates to believe behavior conforming to norm will not result in segregation).
When minor privileges are taken away in accordance with reasonable administrative
policies, however, the procedural protections afforded prisoners are less extensive. See
O'Callaghan v. Anderson, 514 F. Supp. 765, 768-69 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (due process liberty in-
terest not involved in transfer of prisoner within penetentiary).
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Bivens complaints presented allegations that suggested inhumane treat-
ment of prisoners."'
In addition to the Bivens action, remedies under the Federal Tort
Claim Act (FTCA),11 3 and the federal statutes of habeas corpus"' and
mandamus," 5 may provide a means of redress for prisoners suing federal
officials for violations of the prisoners' constitutional rights. The FTCA
requires the United States to pay damages for certain tortious acts com-
mitted by federal officials."1 6 The federal habeas corpus statute provides
a means by which some federal courts rule on federal prisoners' condi-
tions of confinement cases, and occasionally enjoin the actions of federal
officials.1 7 Finally, the federal mandamus statute authorizes federal
courts to compel federal officials to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff
prisoner. '
Prisoners occasionally are able to bring suits against federal officials
under the FTCA."9 The FTCA allows federal courts to hear suits against
the United States in which plaintiffs seek to recover damages for the
tortious conduct of federal officials acting within the scope of the of-
ficials' employment.20 The FTCA, therefore, waives the government's
sovereign immunity for officials' actions that satisfy the Act's
provisions.' Congress amended the FTCA in 1974 to expand the Act's
coverage beyond recovery for the negligent acts of federal officials."
The 1974 amendment removed the government's sovereign immunity for
specific intentional torts committed by investigative or law enforce-
ment officers.'" Even as the amendment passed Congress, however, pro-
"' See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980) (damage remedy available for federal of-
ficials' medical mistreatment of prisoner); Botway v. Carlson, 474 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Va.
1979) (damage remedy available when prison conditions substandard); supra notes 38-42 and
accompanying text (discussing Green decision).
113 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V.
1981).
m Id. § 2241 (1976).
1 Id. § 1361.
" Id. § 1346(b), see infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (FTCA remedy in federal
prisoners' actions).
117 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976); see infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (habeas corpus
remedy for prisoners challenging conditions of confinement).
I's 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976); see infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (mandamus
remedy in federal prisoners' actions).
11, See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (describing federal prisoners' FTCA
actions).
', 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
21 Id.; see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (sovereign immunity of United
States government in Bivens actions).
'" Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1970)); see S. REP. No. 588, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEws 2789, 2790-92. See generally Boger, Gitenstein, and Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims
Act Intentional Torts Amendment. An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REV. 497 (1976)
(thorough analysis of 1974 FTCA amendment).
1" 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). The 1974 FTCA amendment specifically established federal
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ponents of the legislation and the Department of Justice both recognized
that the amendment did not make the FTCA a completely effective
remedy for torts committed by federal officials. 4
The FTCA applies in some federal prisoners' suits against govern-
ment officials.'25 In Carlson v. Green, however, the Supreme Court held
government liability for intentional torts of federal officials arising from assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Id.
-2 See S. REP.- No. 588, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2789,2792 (statement of Sen. Ervin, the 1974 FTCA amendment's chief proponent);
Hearings on H.R. 10439 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 33 at 15 (1974) (testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Jaffe) (criticizing amendment's silence regarding constitutional tort
claims). After the passage of the 1974 amendment to the FTCA, the Department of Justice
introduced several unsuccessful bills in an attempt to amend the FTCA further. See Dolan,
Constituiional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 281, 300-02 (1980)
(describing Department of Justice legislative proposals to increase the effectiveness of the
FTCA). The ninety-sixth Congress also considered a proposal to amend the FTCA. H.R.
2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 3990 (1979) (introduced by Congressmen
Danielson and Rodino). The companion bill in the Senate was S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. 5225, 5274-75 (1979) (introduced by Sen. Kennedy). The bill expired,
however, because Congress did not act upon the legislation before the ninety-sixth session
ended.
Senator Grassly of Iowa introduced yet another bill in the ninety-seventh Congress to
amend the FTCA. See S. 1775, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 12147, 12152-54 (1981).
If enacted, the amendment would provide federal courts with jurisdiction over damages
claims against the United States to redress the constitutional torts of federal employees act-
ing within the scope of their employment. S. 1775, § 1 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976)).
The enactment of the bill would constitute an explicit congressional declaration that the
FTCA remedy is a replacement for the Bivens remedy. See S. 1775, § 1 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981) to provide "an equally effective substitute for any recovery
against the [federal] employee [whose act gave rise to the claim] in his individual capacity
directly under the Constitution"). Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Carlson v. Green,
however, the FTCA remedy will not preclude Bivens claims unless, in addition to being an
express Congressional mandate of the remedy's exclusiveness, the amendment also
transforms the FTCA remedy into an equally effective statutory alternative to the Bivens
remedy. 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980); see supra text accompanying note 46. The proposed
amendment probably would not provide an equally effective alternative to the Bivens
remedy, however, because the resultant FTCA remedy would not allow the recovery of
punitive damages, would bar plaintiffs access to a jury, and would not deter official miscon-
duct since no threat of personal liability would exist. See Hearings on S. 1775 Before the
Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97 Cong., 1st Sess.
27-28 (1979) (prepared statement of Prof. Neuborne presenting views of American Civil
Liberties Union). One of the purposes of broadening the coverage of the FTCA to provide
an exclusive remedy for constitutional violations is to establish a more effective remedy
than the relief the Bivens action currently provides. See id. at I (opening statement of Sen.
Grassly) (commenting on expense and unlikelihood of collectible judgment confronting con-
stitutional tort plaintiffs). The proponents of the legislation, however, probably are concerned
more about reducing the government's costs in defending suits brought against government
officials and dispelling the threat of personal liability which presently diminishes the pro-
ductivity of federal employees. See id. at 13-15 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney
General Schmults).
2 See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (federal prisoner may bring FTCA
action for damages against United States for negligence of government employees).
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that the availability of an FTCA remedy does not preempt a Bivens ac-
tion against federal ,gfficials." 6 The Green Court suggested that the
Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy in four ways."
First, the Bivens remedy deters official misconduct by threatening of-
ficials with personal financial liability.", Second, punitive damages are
available to successful Bivens plaintiffs whereas only compensatory
damages are available in an FTCA action." Third, jury trials are not
available in FTCA actions as they are in Bivens suits.1 3 Fourth, the law
of the individual state in which the violation occurred governs FTCA ac-
tions, making the outcome unpredictable, while the uniform federal com-
mon law for constitutional torts applies in Bivens actions."' In addition
to the disadvantages recognized in Green, the FTCA is deficient as a
means to recompense prisoners harmed by the tortious actions of federal
officials for other reasons. For example, the FTCA does not apply to the
discretionary actions of federal officials, even when the discretionary ac-
tions cause injury.3 ' Thus, when a prison inmate's widow brought an
FTCA action alleging that prison authorities failed to prevent an
inmate's murder, the court dismissed the action stating that the decision
to provide better protection by stationing more correctional officers in-
volved an exercise of discretion." A further disadvantage is that plain-
tiffs are subject to a two year statute of limitations during which time
they must exhaust administrative remedies." Finally, prisoners may not
1- 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980).
' Id. at 20-23; see supra note 42 (Green Court's discussion of superiority of Bivens
claims).
446 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 22 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976)); see Brady v. Smith, 656 F.2d 466, 468
(9th Cir. 1981) (barring federal prisoners' FTCA complaint seeking punitive damages).
11 446 U.S. at 22. Commentators have suggested that a jury trial actually may be an
obstacle in an action against federal officials since jurors frequently are biased against plain-
tiffs in constitutional torts suits. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Dellinger, Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1553 (1972);
Note, "Damages or Nothing"-- The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
667, 692 (1979). The Bivens concurrence, however, noted that the phenomenon of jury
hostility, if it exists, will only serve the beneficial purpose of reducing the number of
frivolous claims. 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that plaintiffs
will not choose to expend resources on Bivens claims if chance of success is slight).
131 446 U.S. at 23.
132 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) (FTCA inapplicable to federal officials' discretionary ac-
tions). Federal officials also must have acted within the scope of their employment when
committing allegedly tortious conduct for the FTCA to apply. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). A
circuit court recently found that a complaint literally alleging that a prisoner's death
resulted from injuries inflicted by United States Marshalls acting in excess of and outside
the scope of their authority was sufficient to satisfy the FTCA requirement that federal of-
ficials have acted within the scope of their employment. See Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876,
879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
' See Garza v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 23, 27 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
' 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). Plaintiffs may bring FTCA lawsuits if they have filed a
damage claim with the administrative agency that employs the tortfeasor within two years
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bring FTCA actions if relief is available under the Federal Prison In-
dustries Fund to compensate prisoners injured in federal prison employ-
ment."5
The FTCA remedy is not appropriate in all federal prisoners' suits,
however, since in some instances prisoners only seek to rectify the con-
ditions of confinement in federal prison. Some courts have utilized the
writ of habeas corpus, which unquestionably provides a means by which
prisoners may challenge the fact or length of incarceration, 3 ' to allow
federal prisoners to dispute the constitutionality of the conditions of con-
finement in prison. 3 ' Because the traditional habeas corpus remedy is
release from prison, however, other courts have held that habeas corpus
is not the proper means for challenging conditions of confinement."
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the controversy involving
the appropriateness of habeas corpus as a remedy for prisoners'
challenges to conditions of confinement, the Court has chosen to
postpone resolution of that dispute. 3'
As a threshold requirement in bringing a federal habeas corpus peti-
tion a prisoner must be in custody. "' Although courts interpret the
custody requirement liberally,' former prisoners whose sentences have
of the injurious conduct and the administrative agency does not grant relief within six months.
Id. § 2675(a). Plaintiffs may only recover the damage amount claimed in the administrative
request. Id. § 2675(b).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1976); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1966) (com-
pensation system established by 18 U.S.C. § 4126 reasonably covers federal prisoners in-
jured in prison employment and therefore is exclusive remedy).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (provides jurisdictional basis for federal
prisoners attacking process of conviction or manner sentence imposed).
' See Albers v. Ralston, 665 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1981) (habeas corpus available to
challenge conditions of confinement when substantial infringement of constitutional rights
alleged); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 360 (8th Cir. 1973) (challenges to conditions of
confinement cognizable in habeas corpus); Cravatt v. Thomas, 399 F. Supp. 956, 963 (W.D.
Wis. 1975) (habeas corpus available in attack on conditions of confinement). Courts that hear
federal habeas corpus petitions challenging conditions of confinement in federal prison
utilize § 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code to provide a jurisdictional predicate for
the habeas corpus petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). Section 2255 of Title 28 of the
United States Code, the general habeas statute for federal prisoners, is not the proper
means of bringing conditions of confinement cases. Id. § 2255; see ALDERSERT REPORT, supra
note 1, at 1 n.8; supra note 136 and accompanying text (proper function of § 2255).
" See Cook v. Hanberry, 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979) (habeas corpus unavailable to
prisoner complaining of mistreatment since proper form of relief is equitable restraint not
release); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979) (habeas corpus unavailable for
challenges to terms and conditions of incarceration since release inappropriate remedy); see
also Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1079-87
(1970) (controversy over usage of habeas corpus as remedy in conditions of confinement
cases).
" See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979).
.. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1976). Habeas corpus petitioners must have exhausted ad-
ministrative remedies. See supra note 75 (federal prisoners' claims dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies).
" See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348-53 (1973) (restraints imposed on
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expired or been vacated will lack standing to bring federal habeas ac-
tions. Persons on parole or probation, however, satisfy the custody re-
quirement and may bring habeas petitions." 2 Damages are unavailable
as a remedy in habeas corpus actions."' Courts that adjudicate habeas
corpus petitions challenging the conditions of confinement generally
limit the relief granted for successful petitions to conditional writs."'
Conditional writs direct prison officials to either remedy the contested
condition of confinement or release the prisoner.' Court orders grant-
ing conditional writs, therefore, serve as injunctions forcing prison of-
ficials to improve unconstitutional conditions of confinement. "'
In addition to federal habeas corpus, the federal writ of mandamus
may provide a means to remedy the conditions of prisoners' confine-
ment." 7 Under the authority of the general mandamus statute,' federal
courts may compel federal officials to perform a duty the official owes to
the plaintiff." 9 To obtain a writ of mandamus, however, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the defendant federal officials have failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty."' Additionally, the writ of mandamus is available
only when prisoners have exhausted administrative remedies"' and an
alternative adequate judicial remedy does not exist."'
petitioner released on own recognizance pending execution of sentence constitute custody
within meaning of habeas corpus). The Supreme Court has stated factors courts should con-
sider in determining whether a habeas petitioner is in custody. Id. at 351-52. The factors in-
clude whether petitioner is subject to restraints not shared by the general public or is not
free to leave a particular jurisdiction, whether the petitioner's defiance of the restraints
placed on him would be illegal, or whether the petitioner's freedom is entirely dependent on
the discretion of the state. Id.
"' See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (parole constitutes custody for
purposes of habeas corpus); United States v. Condit, 621 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1980)
(probation constitutes custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus).
"' See J. RESNICK, Federal Prisoners' Access to Federal Courts: Jurisdiction and
Related Procedural Matters, in 1 PRISONERS' RIGHTS 1979 85, 124 (Practising Law Inst. 1979)
(discussing unavailability of damages in habeas corpus proceedings).




"' See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
" Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 744 codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1976).
"4 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
"30 See Anderson v. Luther, 521 F. Supp. 91, 96 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mandamus not available
against Parole Commission to challenge discretionary determination of release on parole);
Fennell v. Carlson, 466 F. Supp. 56, 60 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (dismissing federal prisoner's man-
damus claims challenging prison officials' discretionary authority to transfer prisoners).
"' See Johnson v. Luther, 516 F. Supp. 423, 429 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (dismissing mandamus
action to compel federal prison official to grant furlough when prisoner failed to exhaust
Bureau of Prisons administrative remedies).
" See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (issuance of man-
damus inappropriate in state prisoners' class action when other adequate judicial means to
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The majority of federal prisoners' mandamus actions unsuccessfully
have challenged prison administrative decisions affecting parole
classification of prisoners." In isolated actions, however, federal
prisoners have successfully obtained writs of mandamus to correct un-
constitutional conditions'" or to force compliance with Bureau of Prisons
policy. 55
The judicial remedies, other than the Bivens action, by which
prisoners may sue for federal officials' violations of prisoners' constitu-
tional rights are therefore remarkably inadequate in most cases. The
FTCA remedy, which is the only means other than the Bivens remedy by
which prisoners may seek damages for the tortious conduct of federal of-
ficials, does not prescribe a means of redress for official misconduct that
violates the Constitution. 56 In addition to providing relief for a few
specified intentional torts,5 ' the FTCA redresses only the negligent
misconduct of federal officials." Furthermore, the FTCA requirement
that allows plaintiffs to sue only for injuries resulting from the non-
discretionary actions of federal officials'59 critically restricts the
recovery of prisoners pursuing FTCA relief since many injuries for
which prisoners seek damages result from discretionary actions of
government officials."60 Although the deep pocket of the federal govern-
attain relief available); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir.
1976) (mandamus unavailable when relief requested by federal prisoner available through
habeas corpus).
1" See McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 1980) (dismissing man-
damus action brought by federal prisoner to compel reinstatement of presumptive parole
date); Goode v. Markley, 603 F.2d 973, 975-77 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dismissing federal prisoner's
mandamus action alleging unlawful denial of parole hearing); Butson v. Chairman, United
States Parole Comm'n, 457 F. Supp. 841, 845 (D. Colo. 1978) (dismissing federal prisoner's
mandamus action challenging decision of parole commission for denying request for parole).
But c.f. Holmes v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1976) (jurisdic-
tion established under federal mandamus statute when prisoner alleged prison officials' ar-
bitrary classification of prisoner as special offender affected parole determination), overruled
on other grounds, Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1977).
1 See Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1975) (issuing mandamus writ
requiring provision of food in accordance with Jewish dietary laws); Workman v. Mitchell,
502 F.2d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction provided under mandamus statute to order
federal prison officials' compliance with due process requirements in prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1972) (mandamus granted to provide
federal prisoners access to adequate legal materials).
15 See Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976) (mandamus issued to
compel federal prison officials to comply with Bureau of Prisons policy statement regulating
surveillance of attorney-client mail).
" See supra note 124 (proposed amendment to expand FTCA coverage to include
damages claims for constitutional torts of federal employees).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976); see supra note 123 (specified intentional torts under
FTCA).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
1 Id. § 2680(a).
110 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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ment is available for the recovery of damages in FTCA suits,""' the
amount awarded to prisoners in successful FTCA actions may be defic-
ient since punitive damages are unavailable 6' and compensatory
damages are not likely to be significant in many cases.
Habeas corpus and madamus also are inadequate remedies for
federal prisoners seeking injunctive relief in suits challenging the con-
stitutionality of the conditions of incarceration. Perhaps demonstrating
the habeas corpus remedy's ineffectiveness in conditions of confinement
cases, prisoners' use of the habeas remedy to challenge conditions of con-
finement is declining." Moreover, in some courts habeas corpus is
unavailable to challenge prison conditions."" Prisoners also rarely use
the mandamus remedy which generally has been ineffective in prisoners'
suits. 65 The limited application of the writ of mandamus in prisoners'
cases probably is due primarily to the policy of courts not to grant man-
damus relief if another adequate judicial remedy is available.'66
In comparison to the FTCA, habeas corpus, and mandamus
remedies, the Bivens remedy is a superior means of redress for
prisoners alleging that federal officials have violated the prisoners' con-
stitutional rights. The Bivens remedy is oriented towards redressing
constitutional right deprivations since courts imply the Bivens cause of
action directly from the Constitution."7 Additionally, the Bivens action is
a well recognized remedy that litigants frequently utilize for constitu-
tional right violations.'68 Finally, the Bivens proceeding allows courts to
be flexible in awarding appropriate relief to successful plaintiffs since
both damages and injunctive relief are available as remedial measures.'69
The Bivens action is insufficient in many respects, however. Bivens
plaintiffs must identify specifically the individual defendants allegedly
causing the constitutional deprivation, a difficult task for prisoners in
some cases. 70 Furthermore, the qualified immunity defense that federal
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
"o 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
" See ALDERSERT REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 n.14 (citing Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1979).
'" See supra note 138 (cases in which habeas corpus unavailable to challenge conditions
of confinement). In courts that hear federal habeas corpus petitions challenging conditions
of confinement, the habeas remedy has the advantage of a nominal filing fee of five dollars.
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Supp. V. 1981). Other civil actions require a filing fee of sixty dollars, a
significant sum to some prisoners. Id.
"8 See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying test (federal mandamus remedy in prison-
ers' suits).
16 See supra note 152 (mandamus unavailable when adequate alternative remedy
available).
M67 See supra notes 19-47 and accompanying text (development of constitutionally im-
plied cause of action).
" See supra note 72 (estimated number of pending constitutional tort claims).
181 See supra note 52 (injunctive relief available in Bivens action). -
"' See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (Bivens plaintiffs must identify
specific defendants).
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officials may assert in response to Bivens actions presents a formidable
obstacle to Bivens plaintiffs.' Partially as a result of these limitations,
the Bivens remedy has been glaringly unsuccessful in obtaining
monetary judgments. 2 Moreover, even when courts award damages in
Bivens suits, the plaintiffs may not recover since many federal officials
are virtually judgment-proof."3
No federal statutory remedy exists prescribing a legal means of
redress for instances in which federal officials violate the constitutional
rights of others.' In the Bivens decision,'75 however, the Supreme Court
established a constitutionally implied cause of action by which federal
courts may grant relief to plaintiffs suing federal officials for violations
of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.7 ' The Bivens remedy, along with
the FTCA, federal habeas corpus, and federal mandamus remedies, pro-
vide the only legal recourses available to prisoners alleging that federal
officials have violated the prisoners' constitutional rights. In Bivens
actions, prisoners may sue individual federal officials for damages or in-
junctive relief by demonstrating that the federal officials violated the
constitutional rights of the prisoners. 7 Under the FTCA, prisoners may
recover damages from the federal government for certain tortious acts
committed by federal officials.7 8 In federal habeas corpus proceedings,
some federal courts may issue injunctions against federal officials in
prisoners' conditions of confinement cases. 9 Finally, under the federal
mandamus statute, federal courts may compel federal officials to per-
form a duty the official owes to the prisoner.80 In comparison to the
other available remedies, the Bivens remedy is a superior means to
redress federal officials' violations of prisoners' constitutional rights
because the Bivens action is a well recognized remedy, was created to
redress constitutional deprivations, and grants courts flexibility to
"' See supra notes 82-104 and accompanying text (qualified immunity defense in
prisoners' suits against federal officials).
" See Hearings on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 n.11 (1979) (prepared statement of Attorney General
Schmults) (nine of several thousand filed constitutional tort actions have resulted in money
judgments).
.. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (low incomes of federal officials preclude
substantial recovery).
7 ' See supra note 124 (proposed amendment to expand FTCA coverage to include
damages claims for constitutional torts of federal employees).
"I Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
'16 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussion of Bivens decision).
' See supra notes 71-112 and accompanying text (prisoners' Bivens claims).
.. See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (prisoners' FTCA claims).
"I' See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (habeas corpus petitioners challeng-
ing conditions of confinement).
18 See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (prisoners' mandamus petitions).
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award appropriate relief.' The Bivens action, however, is both ineffec-
tive and inadequate in compensating plaintiffs deprived of constitutional
rights because the success of Bivens suits is dependent upon the per-
sonal liability of individual federal officials who may have qualified im-
munity from suit 8 ' and assets too dimunitive to pay substantial
judgments.' Until Congress passes a more effective remedy,184 however,
the Bivens remedy is the best overall means by which prisoners may sue
federal officials for constitutional deprivations.
TIMOTHY J. KILGALLON
"' See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (advantages of Bivens remedy in
prisoners' rights suits).
'" See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (qualified immunity defense in suits
against federal officials).
'" See supra note 59 and accompanying text (low incomes of federal officials precludes
substantial recovery).
," See supra note 124 (proposed amendment to expand FTCA coverage to include
damages claims for constitutional torts of federal employees).
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